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THE DEATH PENALTY CASES:
A PRELIMINARY COMMENT
John M. Junker*
The next to last step down the long road to total abolition of capital
punishment consists of a period during which the death penalty is
retained as an official symbol but repealed in practice. When the pro-
posed Revised Washington Criminal Code was published in 1970, this
schizophrenic phase was already well under way, dating from at least
1967, the year of the last execution in this country.1 The political
message suggested by this state of affairs is that while the death pen-
alty ought to be retained in the crime-prevention arsenal, it should be
used only rarely. In attempting to legitimize disuse of the penalty by
making it much more narrowly available than the current law has al-
lowed,2 the Proposed Code may be viewed as adopting this political
view. The Proposed Code thus represents no departure from actual
practice; rather, it represents a rationalization and codification of that
practice. 3
It is mildly ironic that Washington's preparations drastically to
prune the hanging tree should be interrupted by the United States
Supreme Court's pronouncement that the tree was already dead. For
whatever else one may make of the per curiam decision and nine
opinions rendered by the Court in Furman v. Georgia,4 it is clear that
five of the Justices believe at least that capital punishment, as presently
administered, violates the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. The irony is strengthened by the possible
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., Washington State, 1959; J.D.,
University of Chicago, 1962.
1. REV. WASH. CRIM. CODE § 9A.32.025, Comment (Tent. Draft 1970) [hereinafter
cited as R.W.C.C.].
2. Capital punishment is currently governed by WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.030
(1959), which grants the jury discretion to impose the death penalty in cases of first de-
gree murder. Section 9A.32.025 of the Proposed Code also grants to the jury discre-
tionary power to impose the death penalty, but only under limited circumstances. See
note entitled "Homicide" at p. 203 of this volume.
3. Governor Evans stated shortly after his election in 1964 that he favored abol-
ishing the death penalty in Washington state. Governor Evans "termed the state's
hangman rope as 'barbaric'..." Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 23, 1964, at 1, col.
4. No person has been executed in Washington since 1963. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.025,
Comment at 124.
4. 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972). There were two companion cases decided by the
Court in this opinion: Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch v. Texas.
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constitutionality of capital punishment mandatorily imposed on all
persons convicted of a particular offense, which suggests that the
only constitutionally permissible direction for legislative "reform" of
capital punishment may lie not in contracting its present scope, but in
expanding it by withdrawing from judge and jury discretionary power
not to impose the death penalty.
I. SOME COMMON GROUND
The Court's grant of certiorari in Furman was limited to the ques-
tion whether the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments.5 The Court's per curiam reversal, in which
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall concurred,
holds simply that it does, "in these cases."'6 Each of the concurring
Justices explains his vote in a separate opinion in which no other Jus-
tice joins. The Nixon-appointed dissenters are better organized: each
joins the separate opinion of the others, except for Justice Blackmun's
"somewhat personal" comments. 7
Despite the divisions that separate the minority from the majority
and the latter from one another, all of the Justices adhere, at least by
necessary implication, to certain common principles. Chief among
these are: (1) that the text of the Constitution and Bill of Rights does
not preclude the Court's determination that the death penalty consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment and, concommitantly, (2) that the
cruel and unusual punishment clause prescribes a flexible, dynamic
standard by which to review criminal punishments, a standard de-
signed to reflect the changing moral perceptions of the society. Be-
cause these issues most directly implicate the Justices' views on the
nature of the constitutional document and the Court's role as its ulti-
mate interpreter, their breadth of agreement warrants further exami-
nation.
The textual issue arises from the references in the fifth amendment
to capital punishment: (1) requiring a grand jury indictment for cap-
ital offenses; (2) forbidding government from twice putting a person
"in jeopardy of life;" and (3) conditioning deprivation of life upon
5. 403 U.S. 952 (1971).
6. 92 S. Ct. at 2727 (per curiam).
7. Id. at 2812 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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compliance with due process of law. If the meaning of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause is governed by the framers' intent, Mr.
Justice Black's conclusion in McGautha v. California8 is virtually
compelled: "The Eighth Amendment... cannot be read to outlaw
capital punishment because that penalty was in common use and au-
thorized by law here and in the countries from which our ancestors
came at the time the Amendment was adopted."9
No present member of the Court adheres to the view that because
the framers "intended no absolute bar on the Government's authority
to impose the death penalty,"'10 capital punishment is therefore forever
exempt from nullification under the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. Three of the dissenters explicitly, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist
by necessary implication, endorse the view that the cruel and unusual
punishment clause was "designed to be dynamic and to gain meaning
through application to specific circumstances, many of which were not
contemplated by [its] ... authors."11
Of the dissenters, Mr. Justice Powell does the most fudging. He
notes the three references to capital punishment in the fifth amend-
ment and eventually concludes that, despite these references (and other
considerations based on the principles of stare decisis, judicial
self-restraint and separation of powers) "the most conclusive of objec-
tive demonstrations could warrant this'Court in holding capital pun-
ishment per se unconstitutional."12 But his route to this position may
modify or at least obscure its apparently clear meaning. Mr. Justice
Powell continues, "the Court is not free to read into the Constitution a
meaning that is plainly at variance with its language,' 3 finding au-
thority in that language only "to challenge the imposition of the death
penalty in some barbaric manner or as a penalty wholly dispropor-
tionate to a particular criminal act." a14 That this narrower role of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause may constitute Justice Powell's
dominant position, despite his later concession that the clause could
be15 used to hold capital punishment per se unconstitutional, is sug-
8. 402 U.S. 183(1971).
9. Id. at 226.
10. 92 S. Ct. at 2819 (Powell, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 2819 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 2800 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at
2814 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2826 (Powell, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2819 (Powell, J., dissenting).
14. Id.
15. See note 12 supra.
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gested by his statement that "the burden of seeking so sweeping a de-
cision is almost insuperable.' 6 In any event, the fact of Mr. Justice
Powell's ambivalence is surely less important than the fact that he is
the only Justice whose commitment to a dynamic view of the eighth
amendment is in any way qualified, however ambiguously, by virtue
of the "original intent" as expressed in the text of the Constitution.
The majority necessarily rejects a static view of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause; Justices Douglas, White and Stewart by implica-
tion, and Justices Brennan and Marshall explicitly. Mr. Justice Mar-
shall is content to rely upon Trop v. Dulles"7 and Robinson v. Cali-
fornia8 as establishing the dynamic character of the clause; Mr.
Justice Brennan reasons from the text itself:' 9
No one, of course, now contends that the reference in the Fifth
Amendment to "jeopardy of. . . limb" provides perpetual constitu-
tional sanction for such corporal punishments as branding and ear-
cropping, which were common punishments when the Bill of Rights
was adopted.
If textualism died with Mr. Justice Black, that other perennial of
the Warren Court, federalism, may have survived the death of Mr.
Justice Harlan. Unlike Black's text-thumping fundamentalism, which
derived constitutional principles from the words of the Constitution,
Justice Harlan inferred from the federal structure created by the fram-
ers a constitutional command that the states be allowed a degree of au-
tonomy in their administration of criminal justice. For Harlan, that
meant that state criminal processes should be judged by the more gen-
eral prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment, and he was a constant
dissenter against "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights standards as
explicit limitations on state power.2 0 Only vestiges of the federalist
position appear in Furman. Mr. Justice Powell bows in that direction
by reference to the "shattering effect" of the majority's views "on the
root principles of ... federalism .... ,,21 He and his fellow dissenters,
16. 92 S. Ct. at 2826 (Powell, J., dissenting).
17. 356 U.S. 86(1958).
18. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
19. 92 S. Ct. at 2749 n. 28 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171-193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 65-78, (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. 92 S. Ct. at 2818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
That the federalist position continues to play an occasionally decisive role in con-
stitutional litigation is proved by the Court's decisions, earlier last Term, in Johnson
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however, rely most heavily on a related but distinct structural
proposition: separation of powers. Whereas "federalism" cautions or
commands the Court to defer to the states, "separation of powers"
demands judicial deference to the legislative or executive branches.
But for these vestigial remnants of the once powerful principles of
federalism, to summarize, it is common ground for all the Justices that
the eighth amendment is applicable to the states; that the text of the
Constitution does not bar the conclusion that capital punishment is
"cruel and unusual"; and that the clause "must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. '22
The Court's unanimity that it may decide the issue is in marked con-
trast to its disagreement over what that decision should be, the princi-
ples on which it should be based, and the application of those princi-
ples to the cases before it-issues to which we now turn.
II. McGAUTHA WAS WRONG
Although no more than a quarter of the states have, at any one
time, completely abolished capital punishment, all have responded to
growing anti-capital punishment sentiment over the years by "re-
ducing the number of capital crimes [and] replacing mandatory
death sentences with jury discretion .. ,,23 These same sentiments,
admitted to the jury room by Witherspoon v. Illinois2 4 have steadily
reduced the number of death sentences actually imposed. 25 Execution
of persons sentenced to death has been regularly defeated by the exer-
cise of executive clemency and, increasingly, frustrated by dogged
pursuit of judicial remedies:26
v. Louisiana, 92 S. Ct. 1620 (1972) and Apodaca v. Oregon, 92 S. Ct. 1628 (1972).
There the Court was split 4-4 on the question whether the sixth amendment per-
mitted basing a criminal conviction on a less than unanimous jury verdict. Mr.
Justice Powell's tie-breaking concurrence affirms the constitutionality of such verdicts
in state trials on the ground that although "unanimity is one of the indispensable
features of federal jury trials," (92 S. Ct. at 1637) "the Fourteenth Amendment
[does not] require blind adherence by the States to all details of the federal Sixth
Amendment standards." Id. at 1640.
22. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
23. 92 S. Ct. at 2778 (Marshall, J., concurring).
24. 391 U.S. 510(1968).
25. 92 S. Ct. at 2748-57 (Brennan, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 2754 (Brennan, i., concurring).
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Even before the moratorium on executions began in 1967, executions
totaled only 42 in 1961 and 47 in 1962...; the number dwindled to
21 in 1963, to 15 in 1964, and to seven in 1965; in 1966, there was
one execution, and in 1967, there were two.
Only an inference separates this record of infrequent use of the
death penalty from unconstitutional, arbitrary use of the penalty.
For the majority, "the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is
being inflicted arbitrarily: '2 7
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: "One searches our chronicles in vain for the
execution of any member of the affluent strata of this society. -"2 8
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN: "Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lot-
tery system." '2 9
MR. JUSTICE STEWART: "These death sentences are cruel and unu-
sual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual .... [T]he petitioners are among a capriciously selected
random handful .... 30
MR. JUSTICE WHITE: "[T] here is no meaningful basis for distin-
guishing the few cases in which [the death sentence] is imposed from
the many cases in which it is not.":"1
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL: "[T]here is evidence of racial
discrimination .... It is also evident that the burden of capital pun-
ishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant, and the underprivileged
members of society. 132
For two of the majority, Justices Douglas and Stewart, the record
of arbitrary infliction of the death penalty is alone a sufficient basis for
its invalidation as "cruel and unusual." Mr. Justice Douglas finds the
basic theme of "equal protection of the laws... implicit in the ban on
'cruel and unusual' punishments," 33 and concludes that the power to
discriminate, inherent in statutes authorizing discretionary imposition
of the death penalty, renders them "unconstitutional in their opera-
tion."3 4 Mr. Justice Stewart echoes this view in concluding that "The
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
27. Id.
28. Id. at 2733 (Douglas, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 2754 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 2762 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 2764 (White, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 2790-91 (Marshall, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 2735 (Douglas, J., concurring).
34. Id.
100
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sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty
to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed. '35 Although the other ma-
joihty Justices rest their votes on a variety of constitutional theories,
they too rely on the great infrequency with which the death penalty is
actually imposed.
The majority's reliance on what is in essence an equal protection
theory creates difficulties, both for the Furman decision and for the
future. I shall defer for now discussion of the future issue-the consti-
tutionality of a "mandatory" death penalty. That issue arises because
Furman's equal protection foundation renders it a decision not about
the death penalty, per se, but about the process by which that penalty
validly may be imposed. And because Furman is a process decision, it
demands that McGautha v. California,36 the Court's 1971 decision
upholding the constitutionality of the death imposition process, be
confronted.
McGautha sought, modestly enough, to require that juries empow-
ered to impose or withhold the death penalty be given standards by
which to exercise that power. The Court refused, holding that "In
light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human
knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or
death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. '37
In Furman, however, it is precisely this "untrammeled" discretion
and its consequences that are essential to the Court's decision that the
death penalty, as presently administered, is "offensive" to the Consti-
tution. If Furman is right, McGautha is wrong and should be over-
ruled. But, far from overruling McGautha, Mr. Justice Douglas, in a
dazzling move, turns it to his own advantage, while other concurring
Justices either ignore McGautha or lamely distinguish it.38
Mr. Justice Douglas, who had joined Justice Brennan's dissent in
McGautha, acknowledges "the tension between our decision today
and McGautha,' '3 9 but instead of insisting that it be overruled or
distinguished, he adopts the contrary precedent [McGautha] as "the
seeds of the present cases."'40
35. Id. at 2763 (Stewart, J., concurring).
36. 402U.S. 183 (1971).
37. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
38. 92 S. Ct. at 2762 (Stewart, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 2731 n. I I (Douglas, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 2731 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Douglas might arguably have distinguished McGautha on the
ground that it was a case that dealt solely with the absence of
standards for imposition of the death penalty, whereas Furman called
for a judgment on the overall consequences of a capital punishment
scheme that included not only untrammeled jury discretion not to
impose the penalty, but also untrammeled executive prerogative to set
jury-imposed penalties aside, and, by operation of the elaborate
process of judicial review demanded in capital cases, a predictably
high rate of nullification among the residual cases.
Justice Douglas, however, rejects conventional methods for neutral-
izing contrary precedent and instead insists that the Court is "now
imprisoned in the McGautha holding." 41 His commitment to Mc-
Gautha is obviously tactical, if not sarcastic. He embraces its holding
that unguided jury discretion is not unconstitutional in order to con-
demn the consequences of jury dispensation as "cruel and unusual
punishment." On this view, Furman enjoys the paradoxical distinction
of both denying McGautha (by condemning the process it upheld)
and relying on it (by accepting McGautha's judgment that jury dis-
cretion is not itself unconstitutional).
III. CAUSA MORTIS
I take it to be a rule of logic that if the truth or falsity of a proposi-
tion is not provable, the side on which the burden of proof is placed
cannot prevail, and a rule of politics that, in the same circumstance,
the side with sufficient votes to allocate the burden of proof cannot
lose. The Court's treatment of the deterrence issue exemplifies the
operation of both of these rules. The deterrence issue, precisely if some-
what ponderously put, was this: does the cruel and unusual punishment
clause comprehend the question of the relative efficacy of a particular
punishment to achieve the objectives ascribed to its use? Precedent
held only that a punishment that was excessive relative to the offense
for which it was imposed might therefore be cruel and unusual. 42 The
deterrent efficacy of the death penalty, however, questions not the
disproportion between offense and punishment, but the disproportion
41. Id.
42. See the doctrinal summaries by Mr. Justice Marshall, 92 S. Ct. at 2768, and by
Mr. Justice Powell, id. at 2819-2823.
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between the punishment imposed and the law's objective (e.g., deter-
rence) in imposing it. -
Both the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Powell contend that the
latter inquiry is not within the purview of the eighth amendment.43
Mr. Justice Powell states, "I find no support ... for the view that this
Court may invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less
severe penalties adequate to serve the ends of penology."
Justices Brennan, White and Marshall assume 44 or conclude45 that
the eighth amendment invalidates a punishment for which "there is a
significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes
for which the punishment is inflicted .... -146 Because the other Jus-
tices neither address this question nor rely on its resolution, the doc-
trinal issue is temporarily stalemated. Were the "majority" view to
prevail, however, Chief Justice Burger's view of the scope of such a
doctrine is worth noting:47
If it were proper to put the States to the test of demonstrating the de-
terrent value of capital punishment, we could just as well ask them to
prove the need for life imprisonment or any other punishment.
Everyone concedes that there is no evidence that the death penalty
is superior to life imprisonment as a deterrent.48 At such an empir-
ical impasse, placement of the burden of proof is obviously crucial.
Not surprisingly, the "majority" Justices, by careful framing of the con-
stitutional issue, allot the burden to the government. Mr. Justice Mar-
shall's move is representative: "[T] he question to be considered is not
simply whether capital punishment is a deterrent, but whether it is a
better deterrent than life imprisonment. '49
The dissenters are not taken in. The Chief Justice exposes the ma-
neuver and asserts that burdening the punisher is "not descended from
established constitutional principles, but... born of the urge to by-
43. Id. at 2834-35 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 2805 (Burger, Ci., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2764 (White, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 2746-47 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2773-74 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
46. Id. at 2747 (Brennan, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 2807 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2806-07 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 2782 (Marshall, J., concurring);
id. at 2758 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2812 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2836
(Powell, J., dissenting).




pass an unresolved factual question."5 0 Mr. Justice Powell would
defer to the "presumptively rational" legislative judgment as to a pen-
alty's efficacy or, reaching the question, place the burden on the
petitioners. 5 '
A variant position is taken by Mr. Justice White52 and receded
to by Mr. Justice Brennan:53 that the death penalty as currently
administered is so infrequently imposed as to rob it of any deterrent
potential beyond that achievable by life imprisonment. Other com-
monly held goals of punishment fall victim to the same argument. If a
seldom used death penalty cannot deter, neither can it adequately in-
capacitate particular offenders or satisfy "any existing general need
for retribution."5 4
Disuse of the death penalty thus emerges as the dominant factual
basis for the majority Justices' opinions. To Justices Douglas, Stewart
and Brennan it evidences unconstitutional arbitrariness; 55 to Justices
White and Brennan, as we have seen, disuse of the penalty disables it
from exerting more than negligible deterrent, incapacitative or retribu-
tive effects. 56 And, as we shall see, infrequent use of the death penalty
is also the cornerstone of the view shared by Justices Brennan and
Marshall (and probably White)57 that capital punishment is cruel and
unusual because it "is morally unacceptable to the people of the
United States at this time in their history. ' 58 On this view, capital pun-
ishment wasn't killed by the Court; it had already committed suicide.
IV. MORALITY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
A cynical but not necessarily inaccurate view of the Cobrt's treat-
ment of issues of the magnitude of those presented by Furman involves
demurring to the question whether the Justices decide such issues in
accordance with "their own views of goodness, truth, and justice."59
This stance enables one to cut through the "majority's" protestations of
50. Id. at 2807 (Burger, C.. dissenting).
51. Id. at 2837 (Powell, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2763-64 (White, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 2758 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 2763 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2758-60 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 2735-36 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 2762-63 (Stewart. J., concurring);
id. at 2754-55 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 2763-64 (White, J., concurring); id. at 2758-60 (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 2764-65 (White, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 2788 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 2746 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104
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"objectivity" 60 and the minority's accusations of "subjectivity" 6' as
equally irrelevant, and to focus instead on the nature and variety of
"nonsubjective" sources from which the Justices derive their moral
views. ,
That the cruel and unusual punishment clause requires an assess-
ment of the moral acceptability of a challenged penalty is a proposi-
tion accepted by the minority as well as the majority. 62 Because the
moral and the doctrinal issues are identical in such cases, they provide
a unique and illuminating view of the process by which the moral
judgments that underlie important constitutional judgments are "ex-
ternalized."
It is clear that if "official morality" is controlling, by no stretch of
the data can capital punishment be found morally unacceptable. As
Chief Justice Burger notes, "on four occasions in the last 11 years
Congress has added to the list of federal crimes punishable by death. 63
Forty states and the District of Columbia retain the death penalty
despite a long-standing abolitionist movement. 64 And twenty-five of
twenty-six state appellate courts that have passed on the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty during the past five years have upheld
it. 65 Nor are public opinion polls of any use, for they show no clear
majority for or against capital punishment.66 Where, then, could the
majority look for authoritative indicators of the death penalty's moral
unacceptability? Justices Brennan and Marshall propound separate
but fundamentally similar theories. For Brennan, "The acceptability
of a severe punishment is measured not by its availability, for it might
become so offensive to society as never to be inflicted, but by its use.167
Noting the "successive restriction" of the death penalty-by statute,
jury68 and, in effect, the courts69 -Brennan easily concludes that,
60. See, e.g., the opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall, 92 S. Ct. at 2765.
61. See, e.g., Mr. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion, 92 S. Ct. at 2824-25.
62. Id. at 2746 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2824 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at
2778 (Marshall, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 2801-02 (Burger, Ci., dissenting).
64. See Mr. Justice Marshall's historical sketch of the movement, 92 S. Ct. at
2775-78.
65. Id. at 2830 n. 37 (Powell, J., dissenting). These twenty-five appellate decisions
were, of course, the sources offered by the minority as the legitimate expressions of
public morality. California was the exception. See California v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d
288, 493 P.2d 880, motion to stay judgment denied, 405 U.S. 983 (1972).
66. 92 S. Ct. at 2802 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2747 (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 2764 (White, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 2757 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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judged by "what society does with it,"70 contemporary society has re-
jected the death penalty. 71
Mr. Justice Marshall's theory barely serves to externalize the moral
judgment, since it rests upon the presumed opinions of persons hypo-
thetically endowed with Justice Marshall's views on capital punish-
ment:72
[T] he question.., is not whether a substantial proportion of Amer-
ican citizens would today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is
barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light
of all information presently available.
A public informed that the death penalty is no more effective a deter-
rent than life imprisonment, that it is imposed discriminatorily, and
that it "wreaks havoc with our entire criminal justice system" '73 would
conclude, with Justice Marshall, that "the death penalty is immoral
and therefore unconstitutional. 7 4
The dissenting Justices condemn these views as undemocratic, 75
violative of the principle of separation of powers,76 and lacking, need-
less to say, the proper "judicial restraint. '77 While none would deny
the Court's ultimate authority to strike down a legislated penalty as
cruel and unusual, all would erect a protective presumption to safe-
guard the legislative judgment:78
[I] n a democracy, the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the
basic standards of decency prevailing in the society. [It] ... can only
be negated by unambiguous and compelling evidence of legislative
default.
In the end, however, 'the minority fails to persuade. If there was no
precedent for finding the death penalty cruel and unusual, neither was
there any forbidding that conclusion. And Justice Brennan's answer to
the minority's structural arguments is surely sufficient: "Judicial
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2789 (Mlarshall, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 2790 (Marshall, J., concurring).
74. id.
75. Id. at 2800-01 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2818 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2844 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 2825-26 (Powell, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 2816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2843-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
id. at 2825 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2801 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Justice Powell's dissenting opin-
ion, id. at 2826.
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enforcement of the Clause . . .cannot be evaded by invoking the
obvious truth that legislatures have the power to prescribe punish-
ments .... '179
Given the freedom, then, to judge the constitutionality of the death
penalty, the determinative issue would seem to be the accuracy of the
majority's description of the penalty in operation. For if it is true that
capital punishment is imposed arbitrarily and discriminatorily, that it
serves no legitimate deterrent or other function, and that its existence
plagues the entire criminal justice system then it ought to be con-
demned as cruel and unusual. Only if this description of the reali-
ties of capital punishment is refuted, as the minority failed effectively
to do, can one see the necessity for "judicial restraint" or the relevance
of "separation of powers."
V. POST MORTEM
An issue for the future remains: would a death penalty mandatorily
imposed upon conviction of a specified offense also be unconstitu-
tional? Although only the opinions of Justices Brennan, Marshall
and perhaps White80 would go so far, a potential majority against
mandatory capital punishment might also include: Mr. Justice Doug-
las, who expressly reserves the question;81 and, from the Furman
minority, Mr. Justice Blackmun, who considers the death penalty
abhorrent and useless82 and for whom its mandatory imposition
would be "regressive" and "antique";8 3 and Chief Justice Burger, who
"could more easily be persuaded that mandatory sentences of death,
without the intervening and ameliorating impact of lay jurors, are so
arbitrary and doctrinaire that they violate the Constitution. '8 4
Furman does not, of course, hold that statutorily-mandated capital
punishment is constitutional. Nor does it reject any theory upon which
a determination that such a punishment scheme is also unconsitutional
might be based. Indeed, Furman suggests several such theories.
79. Id. at 2741 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 2764 (White, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 2736 (Douglas, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2812 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2816 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).




As we have seen, unequal imposition of capital punishment is the
empirical, if not the technical, foundation for the Court's ruling that
permissive death penalty statutes are unconstitutional. As Mr. Justice
Douglas notes, "such conceivably might [also] be the fate of a man-
datory death penalty .... 85 Even a mandatory statute would be
unlikely to bar the prosecutor from exercising his traditional discretion
to charge an offense carrying a lesser penalty. Nor would such a
statute be likely to prohibit the intercession of executive clemency.
And even the legislature is powerless to eliminate jury nullification of
a mandatory penalty by returning unwarranted acquittals or, more
likely, convictions for lesser offenses. If, by the operation of these or
other processes, mandated death sentences were as randomly and
suspiciously imposed as permissive death sentences had been, Furman
itself would call for their invalidation.
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
The eighth amendment provides at least two theoretical bases for
the unconstitutionality of a mandatory death penalty. First, it is con-
ventional doctrine that a penalty may be found to be cruel and unusual
"because it is abhorrent to currently existing moral values." 86 Because
the cruel and unusual punishment clause is conceded to be dynamic,
no penalty, mandatory or otherwise, can escape constitutional assess-
ment of its continuing "moral acceptability." A second theory around
which a majority might form to strike down mandatory capital punish-
ment questions not its acceptability but its efficacy. If to escape invali-
dation as cruel and unusual punishment the death penalty must be
shown to be a superior instrument of deterrence, incapacitation or
retribution, what reason is there to suppose that mandatory capital
punishment will fare better than its discretionary predecessor? There
is still no evidence that capital punishment deters or incapacitates
more effectively than life imprisonment. And if retribution is a legiti-
mate governmental objective8 7 it is not apparent that life imprisonment
is inadequate to slake the thirst for revenge.
85. Id. at 2735 (Douglas, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 2774 (Marshall, J., concurring).
87. See 92 S. Ct. at 2761 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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My hunch is that Furman spells the complete end of capital punish-
ment in this country, not because its logic requires it, but because the
moral authority of the Court will command it, and because I think I
hear a collective sigh of relief emanating from legislators who have
more important business to attend to than the passage of necessarily
narrow, probably futile and possibly unconstitutional death penalty
statutes.
109
